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Resistance to Nuclear Waste Disposal: 
Credentialed Experts, Public Opposition 
and their Shared Lines of Critique 
Darrin Durant 
York University 
Abstract: This article asks the question whether, in regard to controversial 
technical decision-making, lay public groups advance different kinds of resis-
tance than credentialed experts. This question is explored via a case-study analy-
sis of one of Canada's major public controversies of the past quarter century -
nuclear waste disposal. Having arrived on the policy radar in 1977, nuclear waste 
remained an internal government/nuclear industry matter until terms of reference 
for a public inquiry were announced in 1989. Several access points for public 
input followed that announcement: scoping sessions in 1990, comments received 
during 1994-96 on an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepared by Atomic 
Energy Canada Limited (AECL), nation-wide public hearings in 1996-97, and 
ongoing public consultation since 2002. This article focuses on the comments on 
the EIS, and discusses several lines of shared resistance: the expert judgment of 
AECL was disputed, the lack of peer review was criticized, accusations of unreli-
ability were made, and general deficiencies in the EIS were attributed to narrow 
terms of reference and poor institutional culture. This article recommends the use 
of a dramaturgical approach to technical texts, and reveals the assumptions 
framing the dualist notion that one can unambiguously separate technical and 
social criticisms of technical projects. 
Résumé : Dans cet article, nous nous interrogeons sur la spécificité des actes de 
résistance des associations citoyennes lors de controverses techniques. Nous 
explorons cette question par l'analyse d'une des controverses publiques les plus 
importantes au Canada au cours des dernières décennies : la gestion des déchets 
nucléaires. Arrivés sur la scène politique en 1977, les déchets nucléaires 
demeurent un enjeu limité au gouvernement et à l'industrie nucléaire jusqu'à ce 
que les termes de références pour une enquête publique soient annoncés en 1989. 
Les possibilités pour le public de faire valoir son point de vue se multiplient dès 
l'annonce de l'enquête : des séances d'information en 1990, la réception de 
commentaires entre 1994 et 1996 sur une étude d'impacts environnementaux 
(EIE) préparée par Énergie Atomique du Canada Limité (EACL), des audiences 
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publiques à la grandeur du pays en 1996 et 1997, et une consultation publique 
continue depuis 2002. Cet article s'intéresse aux commentaires sur l'EIE, et 
discute plusieurs arguments que partagent les associations citoyennes et les 
experts techniques: la contestation du jugement expert de l'EACL, la critique de 
l'absence d'évaluation par les pairs, l'accusation de manque de fiabilité, et 
l'attribution des carences de l'EIE à l'étroitesse des termes de références et à une 
pauvre culture institutionnelle. L'article recommande une lecture dramaturgique 
des textes techniques, et révèle les conditions de notre incapacité à séparer 
clairement les critiques techniques et sociales des projets techniques. 
In the domain of controversial technical decision-making, do lay public 
groups advance different kinds of resistance than credentialed experts? 
Departing from the tenacious myth that dissent in regard to technical 
claims necessarily has a different basis and different style if performed by 
lay public groups or credentialed experts, this paper discusses several 
lines of shared resistance that were on display in a major public 
controversy. The controversy is the Canadian debate over nuclear waste 
disposal. Since the mid-1970s Canadian policy makers have supported 
deep geological disposal, in the plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield, as 
their preferred nuclear waste management approach. Following internal 
negotiations (1984-89) between federal/provincial governments and 
Canada's major nuclear industry players (primarily Atomic Energy 
Canada Limited (AECL) and Ontario Hydro), the terms of reference for a 
public inquiry were settled by 1989. Public input was sought at scoping 
sessions in 1990. Public hearings were held 1996-97 (run by a Panel 
chaired by Blair Seaborn). The inquiry mandate limited discussion to 
debates about a 'concept' only (a proposed deep geological repository), 
rather than any specific sites, an implementing agency, or the future of 
nuclear energy. Before the hearings AECL released an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) in 1994. This paper concentrates on the 65 written 
submissions to the Seaborn Panel (submitted 1994-96) regarding the 
adequacy and completeness of the AECL EIS. 
The Seaborn Panel established guidelines1 in 1992 for AECL to follow 
in preparing an EIS. The guidelines included directions to make the EIS 
accessible to a broad audience, to make clear the basis of support for the 
concept, and to include discussion of differences of opinion within the 
field. Participants at this stage (1994-96) were asked to conclude, not on 
whether the concept was feasible, but on whether the EIS was adequate, 
complete, and in conformity with the guidelines. If we jump to the 
1. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA), Final Guidelines for the 
Preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement on the Nuclear Fuel Waste 
Management and Disposal Concept, Canadian Environmental Assessment Panel (Ottawa: 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, March 1992). 
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conclusion of the public inquiry, in 1998 the Seaborn Panel cited a host of 
social and technical shortcomings that rendered the disposal concept a 
good start for a conceptual project, but otherwise lacking in public 
acceptability and in need of a fresh start. The Panel recommended the 
formation of an arm's length (from industry) agency to work toward a 
disposal concept based on "social safety."2 The federal Government 
response was premised on a specific interpretation of the Panel findings: 
technical matters were largely on a sound footing, the remaining problem 
being that of social acceptability.3 This implicitly divided resistance to the 
disposal concept into narrow technical complaints versus a more diffuse 
public distrust. The former could best be left to technical agencies such as 
AECL or Ontario Hydro. The latter could be managed by an industry-
based agency (the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO)), 
established in 2002, to make proposals for disposal that would be socially 
acceptable. 
This dualist strategy institutionalizes a perceived dichotomy between 
technical and social sources of resistance. It simultaneously projects onto 
particular groups a model of their own cognitive and social action. Policy-
maker assumptions that a clear, split exists, with groups advancing either 
technical or social criticism, are built into policy itself. The policy projects 
onto particular groups models of themselves, in the form of a priori 
categorization of responses as technical-social, either/or. Coding respon-
ses according to this division solidifies and retroactively justifies the built-
in assumptions. In effect the dualist strategy deletes the possibility that 
shared reasons and styles inform(ed) resistance. Acknowledging the 
existence of shared lines of dissent would contradict the assumption that 
credentialed experts advance rational and informed critique, in contrast to 
the emotional and subjective critique of public groups. Hierarchical policy 
solutions would also be disrupted, making it more difficult to justify a 
policy response structured by differential treatment of dissenters. If the 
type of resistance is the same across different groups, then why respond to 
different groups in different ways? To highlight the shared lines of 
resistance, this paper makes use of the dramaturgical framework 
articulated by Stephen Hilgartner, who analyzed science advice as "a form 
of drama, examining how it is produced, performed, and subjected to 
critique."4 Both those who produce advisory or technical reports, and 
2. CEAA, Report of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept 
Environmental Assessment Panel, Canadian Environmental Assessment Panel, No. EN-
106-30/1-1998E (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, February 1998). 
3. Natural Resources Canada, Government of Canada Response to Recommendations of 
the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment 
Panel (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group Inc., December 1998). 
4. Stephen Hilgartner, Science oh Stage: Expert Advice as Public Drama (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), 6. 
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those who critique them, are performers—artful presentations and stylized 
productions are all part of the theatrical contests we know of as debates 
about socio-technical social problems. 
Hilgartner's metaphor of the 'stage' builds upon standard emphasis upon 
the metaphor of the 'text'. The metaphor of the text draws attention to the 
rhetoric and narrative of a performance, such as the mobilization of allies, 
or the boundary work engaged in to distinguish science and politics. For 
Hilgartner the metaphor of the stage focuses attention upon "the dialectic 
of self-revelation and concealment through which advisors present them-
selves."5 Modes of information control, in which some things are 
deliberately displayed—the front stage—and some things actively 
concealed—the backstage—are central to the success of any performance. 
This paper thus discusses the narrative style and rhetorical character of the 
EIS, treating it as a public performance to gain credibility. 
As a dramatic act, I begin with an analysis of how the EIS was 
performed both as narrative and rhetoric. I then move to an analysis of the 
backstage work: the individuals and groups that commented on the EIS 
prior to the public hearings and what they said, how the evidence on 
display in the EIS was questioned, and the work done to actually get the 
EIS produced in the first place. The thesis of the paper is two-fold. One, 
questioning the performance takes the critic full circle to the conditions of 
production, while endorsing the performance simultaneously backstages 
the conditions of production. Two, shared lines of resistance were 
prominent in critiques of AECL's EIS: there was a shared resistance to 
the rhetoric of expert judgment, and to the perception of a lack of 
independent peer review. An accusation of unreliability was common. The 
causes of the deficiencies in the EIS were collectively located in the 
political negotiations (1981-89) over the terms of reference for the public 
inquiry and the 'body language' (how the institution behaved; the social 
interests perceived to reside within it) of AECL. 
The empirical materials utilized for this paper are as follows (Table 1). 
One is the EIS itself,6 which (along with its nine supporting documents) 
was available for review from 26th October 1994. Two, the two volumes 
of comments received on the adequacy of the EIS.7 These were received 
during the period 8th November 1994 - 8th August 1995. Individual 
citizens, Non-Government Organizations (NGO), public interest groups, 
First Nations, government, industry, and technical specialists all reviewed 
5. Ibid., 11. 
6. AECL, Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada's 
Nuclear Fuel Waste, AECL-10711, COG-93-1 (Pinnawa: AECL, 1994). 
7. CEAA, Compendium of Public Comments on the Adequacy of the Environmental 
Impact Statement on the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept, Nuclear 
Fuel Waste Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel, 2 Volumes (Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Services, August 1995). 
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the EIS and sent comments to the Panel. Three, there is the contribution 
by the Scientific Review Group (SRG), which reported to the Panel as an 
independent body of scientific advice. The relevant SRG documents are 
the report itself, the transcript of proceedings when the SRG appeared 
before the Seaborn Panel prior to the public hearings, and a later SRG 
addendum to their original report.8 Four, I analyze the Atomic Energy 
Control Board (AECB)9 Regulatory Document R-71,10 on geological 
disposal of nuclear waste. 
Table 1. Selective chronology of Canada's nuclear waste disposal controversy. 
Date Publication/Event 
1977-89 Internal Provincial-Federal Government Policy-Making 
AECB Regulatory Document R-71, AECB R-71 [note 10] 
4 October 1989 Seaborn Panel established; terms of reference released for public 
inquiry 
1990 Scoping sessions 
18 March 1992 EIS Guidelines issued to AECL [note 1] 
1994 AECL releases its EIS [note 6] 
1994-96 65 public responses to the EIS [note 7] 
1995-96 SRG responses to the EIS [note 8,9, 10] 
1996-97 Public Inquiry held across Canada 
February 1998 Panel releases its report [note 2] 
December 1998 Federal Government response to Panel [note 3] 
November 2002 Federal Nuclear Fuel Waste Act enacted, and Nuclear Waste 
Management Organization (NWMO) established 
November 2005 NWMO final recommendations [note 96] 
8. CEAA, An Evaluation of the Environmental Impact Statement on Atomic Energy of 
Canada Limited's Concept for Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, Report of the 
Scientific Review Group, Advisory to the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal 
Concept Environmental Assessment Panel (Ottawa: Supply and Services, October 1995); 
Transcript of Proceedings with the Scientific Review Group (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 
November 1995); An Addendum to the Report of the Scientific Review Group, Advisory 
to the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment 
Panel (Ottawa: Supply and Services, September 1996). 
9. The AECB is now known as the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), which 
came into being on 31 May 2000.1 have retained the older name. 
10. AECB, "Regulatory Policy Statement Deep geological disposal of nuclear fuel waste: 
background information and regulatory requirements regarding the concept assessment 
phase," Regulatory Document R-71 (Ottawa: AECB, January 1985). 
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Front Stage: The Identity and Narrative of the EIS 
As Hilgartner suggests, public identity is an ambiguous entity: 
(theoretically) it can be either a stable artifact deployed in interactions 
with audiences, or a construct formed by the perceptions and understan-
dings of an actor's audience(s). Given such ambiguities, Hilgartner 
cautions that an actor's public identity is best conceived of as both 
situated and formed in the interactions between actors and audiences. 
Nevertheless AECL and Ontario Hydro embody the technical expertise 
promoting and developing nuclear power in Canada. The AECL EIS 
represented authoritative scientific testimony (rather than fictional 
writing) because it emanated from these organizations: it represented what 
technical elites within the Canadian nuclear industry regarded as an 
accurate, reliable, scientific appraisal of the concept of deep geological 
disposal of nuclear waste. Yet the EIS was more than a technical report. 
The public identity of AECL and Ontario Hydro, as policy actors, 
established the EIS as a contribution to policy-making. 
The narrative of the EIS does not allow the reader to settle in one place. 
First, the EIS is a very large document. In fact the EIS is not a single 
document, but one accompanied by allied documents. There is the 
obligatory (policy) summary,11 plus nine "primary references," each 
several hundred pages in themselves.12 The effect is to force the reader, if 
he/she wishes to pursue claims, to go deeper and deeper into supporting 
documentation. Second, the EIS refers to thousands of semiotic 
characters, or characters that may exchange signifying roles.13 These 
semiotic characters range from "CANDU reactors" to "owners of used 
fuel," from "host communities" to "radionuclides," and from "salt water 
salinity" to "hydrogeologist." In effect AECL was able to distribute 
agency across nature and the experienced judgment of AECL scientists, as 
the reader was constantly confronted by differing sources of authority 
(nature speaks, but so do nuclear experts). 
Ideally a sense of the persuasive rhetoric of the EIS could be conveyed 
by a detailed exposition of the story AECL tells concerning its history and 
11. Atomic Energy Canada Limited, Summary of the Environmental Impact Statement on 
the Concept for Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste, AECL-10721, COG-93-11 
(Pinnawa: AECL, 1994). 
12. There is the R-Public, which will be discussed in this paper, and then eight other 
primary references: Site Screening and Site Evaluation Technology (R-Siting), Engineered 
Barriers Alternatives (R-Barriers), Engineering for a Disposal Facility (R-Facility), 
Preclosure Assessment of a Conceptual System (R-Preclosure), Postclosure Assessment of 
a Reference System (R-Postclosure), The Vault Model for Postclosure Assessment (R-
Vault), The Geosphere Model for Postclosure Asessment (R-Geosphere), and The 
Biosphere Model, BIOTRAC, for Postclosure Assessment (R-Biosphere). 
13. Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through 
Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 53. 
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purpose. Following a suggestion to use dialogues to bring out the 
persuasive force of scientific reports,14 Hilgartner constructed a dialogue 
between an imaginary skeptic, and verbatim answers drawn from an 
analysis of the American National Academy of Science report Diet, 
Nutrition, and Cancer}5 Lacking the space to do so here, I take up 
Hilgartner's second suggestion. This involves using 'concept maps' to 
represent the structure of narratives.16 
The act of skepticism is always, in principle, open-ended. We can thus 
note from Figure 1 that any skeptic would have to challenge a good deal 
of people and things. The skeptic would have to challenge the whole 
Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program (NFWMP), for one thing. The 
EIS made clear that the NFWMP formed part of the broader organizations 
of AECL and Ontario Hydro, each one consisting of qualified technical 
experts. If the skeptic follows the logic of the EIS, which identified AECL 
as the "proponent," then the skeptic was faced with challenging AECL. 
The members of AECL should not to be thought of in individualistic 
terms. Rather they are representatives of domains of technical expertise, 
or "delegates from the disciplines or other social and cognitive institutions 
which form their background."17 As delegates, the members of AECL 
speak for their areas of specific knowledge. Overall the EIS was always 
more than the sum of its parts: the mixture of experts and broad 
consultation situated the EIS as part of a broader constituency. As is 
common in public hearings, participants discover that one of the 
conditions of representation is how to negotiate the relation between the 
group represented and the delegate representing them. Delegates give 
voice to groups, simultaneously drawing upon their collective power in 
the act of creating that collective via representation. Yet it is always 
available to combatants to attempt to dissociate the delegate from the 
collective, reducing their symbolic power. Our skeptic would thus be 
faced by the many chains of associations that link AECL to other 
organizations, institutions, projects of research, and individuals of special 
merit. 
Figure 1 presents chains of associations, and is designed to give a visual 
impression of the scope and complexity of the challenge that would be 
required in order to dispute the EIS. 
14. Bruno Latour and Françoise Bastide, "Writing Science - Fact and Fiction" in Mapping 
the Dynamics of Science and Technology: Sociology of Science in the Real World, eds. 
Michel Callon, John Law, and Arie Rip (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1986), 51-66. 
15. Hilgartner, 46-48. 
16. Hilgartner, 49. On concept maps, see Joseph D. Novak and D. Bob Go win, Learning 
How to Learn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
17. H.M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice 
(London: SAGE, 1985), 148. 
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Figure 1. A Conceptual Structure of the EIS Narrative. 
This map presents the conceptual structure of the narrative-style arguments the EIS makes to 
warrant its authority. Reading through tlie nodes (circles) and links (lines, with accompanying 
text) of the map produces statements that summarize aspects oftlie EIS narrative. 
Challenging the credibility of the EIS involves questioning the collective 
resources of specific scientific fields, other contributing organizations, the 
experience gained from participation in international research projects, the 
connections made by representatives on international agencies dealing 
with nuclear regulation, the value gained from exchanging information 
Resistance to Nuclear Waste Disposal 9 
with other countries, the perspective gained by speaking to a broad 
constituency of interested parties and groups, and AECB regulatory 
competence. As a text, the EIS thus set up a formidable defense against 
challenge by constructing a web of associations. The entities in that web 
carried mixtures of different kinds of prestige: technical, political, social. 
The EIS derived a little bit of authority from each link to a reputable 
organization, known scientific specialty, and example of broad 
consultation. The EIS also used several 'props' to bolster its authority, 
such as 'the evidence' mobilized (2,400 publications) and the funds spent 
($413 million). 
As we move into the backstage, we will see that pieces of the web can 
be criticized without undoing all of the associations. A web of 
associations thus provides both a defense against challenge and an 
opportunity to tinker with parts of the web. The strength of the web is thus 
related, not simply to the number of nodal points and the connections 
between them, but also to the strategic opportunities afforded by allowing 
local criticisms that do not thereby have global repercussions (throughout 
the web). 
Front Stage: The Rhetoric of Expert Judgment 
Aside from the structure of the narrative, Hilgartner notes that advisory 
and technical reports use discursive devices to build authority and credi-
bility. Drawing upon the work of Gilbert and Mulkay on discourse 
analysis, Hilgartner suggests many advisory and technical reports weave 
together rhetorics that enhance their authority in one of two ways: either 
by letting scientific evidence simply speak for itself or by displaying 
interpretive conclusions reached by qualified experts through judicious, 
rational deliberation.18 
Gilbert and Mulkay previously described two repertoires for establishing 
the character of scientific actions and beliefs. 
In the empiricist repertoire actions and beliefs must be seen to be 
universal and impersonal, so that the author's actions are irrelevant to the 
content of knowledge claims—"nature has spoken." In the contingent 
repertoire, actions and beliefs are related to the vagaries of time and place, 
or the judgments of specific individuals within particular social spaces.19 
Hilgartner situates the rhetoric of expert judgment in between these two 
repertoires. While such rhetoric does not present knowledge claims as 
simple mirrors of nature, it is at pains to present claims as the product of 
careful deliberation by experienced practitioners. The EIS certainly 
contains examples of the empiricist repertoire, but its rhetoric of expert 
18. Hilgartner, 51. 
19. G. Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, Opening Pandora's Box: A Sociological 
Analysis of Scientists' Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 39-62. 
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judgment was apparent to both supporters and critics of the EIS. Yet 
praising or questioning this judgment did not align neatly with supporter 
and critic (as one might expect). Rather, the problems and pitfalls of 
expert judgment were a resource for both critics and supporters alike. 
Two tasks the EIS had to accomplish concerned environmental safety 
and justifying the choice of plutonic rock for the repository. Long term 
environmental safety predictions appealed to local familiarity: "Our 
expectations are based on an understanding developed during more than 
15 years of field and laboratory research conducted in Canada and 
internationally."20 The suitability of plutonic rock hinged on what "we 
judge to be important,"21 and also upon "our investigations at field 
research areas"22 in regards to the Canadian Shield characteristics and 
plutonic rock. This combination of experience-based claims and 
competent judgment was a consistent feature of the EIS. Thus in 
discussing the disposal vault and disposal containers AECL both appeals 
to its own scientists and their "laboratory experiments to study the 
behaviour of glass and glass-ceramic waste forms in groundwaters,"23 
while also reaching out across its web of associations to recruit the 
"extensive experience in mining and construction" of other trusted bodies 
of expertise.24 Where limitations to knowledge arose, such as monitoring 
in disposal rooms, discrimination between options was firmly rooted in 
expert judgment: "we believe the limitation ... would be better addressed 
[via some kind of fault tree analysis]."25 
Public and government concern extended to transporting waste as well. 
AECL's strategy here involved simultaneous appeal to the experience and 
competence of parts of its web of support, Ontario Hydro's experience 
with transporting waste, and the assurance of quantification: 22,000 
shipments, 4 million kilometers, 3 accidents, no fatalities;26 an accident 
rate of 0.01%. What about local socio-economic effects? Again 
experience is the key: local residents near the Point Lepreau reactor, or the 
Saskatchewan uranium mines, and the waste treatment facility at Swan 
Hills in Alberta, had all experienced employment benefits.27 Any danger 
to workers at such places was minimized by the experience of Ontario 
Hydro and Transport Canada.28 Even if employment stops because of 
20. AECL, Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada's 
Nuclear Fuel Waste (hereafter, EIS), 82. 
21. Ibid, 95. 
22. Ibid, 106. 
23. Ibid, 143. 
24. Ibid, 111. 
25. Ibid, 180. 
26. Ibid., 189-90. 
27. Ibid, 198. 
28. Ibid, 247. 
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decommissioning, experience with and knowledge about "stringent 
criteria, guidelines and standards" would ensure safety.29 
When AECL turned to its postclosure assessment study, the combination 
of oscillating between the experience of AECL and the consistency of 
AECL's experience with other chains in its web of associations was 
paramount. Thus assuming the disposal vault would be immediately 
saturated upon closure was presented as a conservative assumption 
"consistent with assumptions made in other countries."30 It is confirmed, 
in fact, by "experience at the underground research laboratory" in 
Whiteshell, Manitoba.31 Moreover AECL's "confidence in the 
performance of containers [...] is shared by [...] other countries."32 
Sometimes confidence might be difficult because of the indeterminacy of 
the problem, such as identifying potential and significant scenarios 
(anywhere from earthquakes to glaciation and human intrusion). Never-
theless AECL reminded the reader "expert judgment played a major 
role".33 AECL's expert judgment was that identifying worst-case 
scenarios was nothing more than "highly subjective" speculation that was 
likely to lead to "very unlikely situations" dominating the analysis.34 In 
effect AECL drew a boundary around what their expert judgment could 
show and what subjective judgment could fabricate unnecessarily. Hence 
one place for negotiating the boundary between expert judgment and non-
expert judgment consisted of the nodes where very unlikely events were 
considered. 
In the EIS conclusions AECL moved from a statement that disposal is 
"needed" to the justification that "current storage practice is a safe interim 
measure, but not a permanent solution."35 The EIS narrative thus sounded 
distinctly like a story in which a crisis is presented, options for securing 
protection from harm are outlined, and the impression of choice is thus 
given. However that choice quickly dissipated, as AECL made clear 
storage could not be relied upon. Active disposal remained the only safe 
option. Next section sees what different groups had to say about this story. 
29. Ibid, 251. 
30. Ibid, 268. Though other countries have made alternative judgments. For instance the 
Americans opted for 'dry is good'. Cf. Allison Macfarlane, "Underlying Yucca Mountain: 
The Interplay of Geology and Policy in Nuclear Waste Disposal," Social Studies of 
Science 33, 5 (2003): 783-807, esp. 794-96. 
31. AECL EIS, 270. 
32. Ibid, 271. 
33. Ibid, 278. 
34. Ibid, 317. 
35. Ibid, 336. 
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Front Stage: Who Said What? 
Following the issuing of guidelines (March 1992), comments were 
solicited regarding the adequacy, sufficiency, and completeness of the 
EIS. Table 2 codifies the 65 submissions to the Panel regarding the 
adequacy and completeness of the EIS. The horizontally-arranged 
spectrum can be read as moving left to right, following degrees of 
approval across to different degrees of disapproval, culminating in very 
strong disapproval. 
Table 2. Respondents to the EIS, and Responses. 
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Total 
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 
NGO's 1 12 13 
Public Interest 2 1 1 3 7 
Private Citizens 3 7 1 11 
Utilities/Industry 6 1 7 
Government 4 1 1 2 8 
Technical Society 1 5 1 1 1 9 
First Nations 1 9 10 
Total 0 6 3 15 3 2 1 0 31 4 65 
9% 5% 23% 5% 3% 2% 48% 6% 
Source : CEAA, Compendium of Public Comments (see note 7). 
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Position #1 (EIS not addressed, but approval for concept) has no 
inhabitants, but was placed in the chart because of position #7 (EIS not 
addressed, but opposed to concept), which has one inhabitant. In this latter 
case, the respondent was violently anti-nuclear and extremely emotional, 
making for a contrast in which no respondent thought it appropriate to be 
rabidly pro-nuclear. 
In regards to position #2 (ritual citation), 9% of respondents, all of them 
affiliated with the nuclear industry in some fashion (e.g.: uranium mining, 
lobby groups) or a nuclear utility, submitted very brief submissions. I call 
them 'ritual citations' because they merely praise the "thorough docu-
menttation" and "credible work" of AECL before strongly recommending 
progress to siting or public hearings. 
Position #3 (EIS adequate; justification &/or options; next stage) 
approved of the EIS, but unlike the ritual citations either discussed 
plausible options on some technical point or gave some other kind of 
justification for their sport, before recommending siting or hearings. Only 
one NGO took position #3 (The National Council of Woman of Canada). 
Regarding position #4 (EIS adequate; minor problems; next stage), 
numbering 23% of respondents (60% of whom were government or 
technical bodies), the criterion here meant groups recommended siting or 
hearings, approved of the EIS, but believed there were a few minor omis-
sions or minor technical errors/problems that needed to be addressed. 
These minor deficiencies ranged from AECL being too cautious and too 
safety conscious, to disagreements over some modeling techniques or risk 
estimates. One First Nations group, the Meadow Like Tribal Council, took 
this position (in contrast to 9 other First Nations groups who were 
strongly opposed), essentially giving the green light to serious dialogue 
with AECL about siting a repository on their tribal lands. 
Position #5 (EIS adequate, but more work needed) is the closest this 
debate gets to 'neutral'. In this case 3% of respondents argued for more 
information in order to make a full recommendation, though they had a 
positive response in general. 
Position #6 (EIS adequate, but major revisions needed) was held by the 
Scientific Review Group (SRG) and Environment Canada. The SRG 
argued that AECL's case for the generic concept of waste disposal was 
fundamentally flawed. The problem was not the concept itself, nor the 
need for waste disposal, nor the premises of reducing burden on future 
generations or the unreliability of institutional controls. Rather, the SRG 
opposed the way in which AECL based its case for the disposal concept 
on its own postclosure reference study. In the EIS there are two case 
studies presented, one by Ontario Hydro (preclosure; hypothetical generic 
facility) and one by AECL (postclosure; site specific, with use of 
modeling programs). The SRG was ambiguous about the Ontario Hydro 
preclosure study (see below), but generally found it to be sufficiently like 
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other nuclear projects, such as building a nuclear power plant, to be 
acceptable. However, the SRG found the AECL postclosure study "unre-
liable," "narrow," and dependent upon questionable modeling and 
unknown expertise.36 Both the SRG and Environment Canada advanced 
major criticisms of the EIS, but endorsed it as adequate nevertheless. 
Position #8 (EIS is inadequate, but deficiencies only minor) is again an 
empty set, yet its emptiness is instructive. If we combine positions #4 
(23%) and #6 (3%), and possibly add the (almost) neutral position #5 
(3%), we have approximately one third of respondents indicating either 
minor or major deficiencies with the EIS, but who refuse to label it 
inadequate. An instructive contrast here is a private citizen taking position 
#4 (J. A. L. Robertson, a long-time AECL employee and well-known 
'nuclear warrior' in Canada), who emphasizes that 
The major point I wish to make in this submission is that none of the omissions 
need delay public hearings on the EIS.37 
In contrast, a private citizen taking position #9 (EIS inadequate, and 
deficiencies significant) emphasizes that : 
Any serious attempt to patch up this "environmental impact statement" would be 
equivalent to trying to cure cancer by applying a bandaid.38 
An NGO taking position #9 quotes the EIS to the effect that progressing 
towards disposal would increase public confidence in Canada's ability to 
manage waste safely, and responds to this emphasis on haste as such. 
Surely the point is to develop and implement a safe plan for waste management, 
not merely to act quickly in hopes of minimizing public concerns about a process 
which, in fact, should be of great concern to the public.39 
Of the 65 submissions, 48% adopted position #9, finding the EIS 
inadequate and riddled with serious deficiencies. Of that 48%, no 
utility/industry group, government agency or technical society adopted 
position #9. 
Finally, there was also position #10 (unclear position), which included 
respondents who made some criticisms of the EIS but did not make a clear 
case either way (adequate or inadequate). The low number in this set (4, 
or 6%) is consistent with general impressions that, in this particular 
debate, all parties have an opinion and few remain non-partisan or 
dispassionate. 
One interpretation of the lack of overlap in position #9 is that the more 
informed sectors of the interested parties 'know enough' to know the EIS 
36. SRG Report, 4,16-17. 
37. J.A.L. Robertson, Public Comments, Pub. 005,1. 
38. Phyllis Robbins, Public Comments, Pub. 010,8. 
39. Concerned Citizens of Manitoba, Public Comments, Pub. 034,2-3. 
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is adequate. However comparison of the critiques of the SRG, 
Environment Canada, and several technical societies, reveals a great deal 
of overlap with many of the NGO critiques (which were typically more 
detailed than that of private citizens). Representative NGOs in this regard 
would be Energy Probe, Northwatch, Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, 
Nuclear Awareness Project, Saskatchewan Environmental Society, and 
the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility. The switch to labeling 
the EIS inadequate is, on a general level, the switch to anti-nuclear 
positions regardless of the EIS. On a more specific level, the switch to 
labeling the EIS inadequate is also a political statement that developments 
should not continue any further. The solidarity that exists between those 
with minor or major criticisms and their semi-distant cousins who 
contribute ritual citations, is matched in polar-fashion by the solidarity 
between those who feel threatened and/or excluded (the 9 First Nations 
groups adopting position #9; 14% of respondents overall) and their semi-
distant cousins who believe only a very strong show of disapproval (48% 
across all groups) will gain the attention of policy-makers. 
Initial coding of the written comments suggest critics of the EIS (as 
inadequate) strongly distrust AECL and Ontario Hydro, which could be a 
reason in itself to label the EIS inadequate (tainted by the source). Yet 
difficulties arising from the specificity of many critiques (limited by Panel 
directives to discuss the conformity of the EIS with the guidelines) mean 
much is implicit in the critiques, rather than explicit. The pace of 
development was one issue that featured explicitly in many critiques. 
Labeling the EIS inadequate was a response to the perception of genuine 
deficiencies in the EIS, but the one third of respondents who perceived 
deficiencies but did not label the EIS inadequate indicates perceiving 
deficiencies alone cannot compel the application of 'inadequate'. To label 
'inadequate', the respondent also saw some danger in the nuclear industry 
wanting to speed up the time-line to approving disposal. If any 
confirmation of this perception was needed, and most long-term anti-
nuclear NGOs already regarded themselves as in possession of such an 
understanding, then the submission of the Research and Development 
Advisory Panel (RDAP) to the Board of Directors of AECL provided 
ample confirmation. 
The Panel [RDAP] is frankly disturbed by the extraordinarily prolonged character 
of the decision process. Merely to obtain federal acceptance of the concept of deep 
geological disposal will have taken nineteen years since its formulation in 1977. 
Site screening for a possible repository cannot even begin until the basic concept is 
accepted ... [RDAP] is disturbed at several aspects of the slowness of the proposed 
action [operation of repository between 2025-2065, with closing in 2065].40 
40. Research and Development Advisory Panel to the Board of Directors of AECL, Public 
Comments, Pub. TEC 007, 3-4. 
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Backstage: Questioning the Evidence 
As we move to consider the backstage, that area of activity the EIS seeks 
to conceal or control impressions about, we begin first with the very 
ability to access what goes on backstage. 
The Panel guidelines called for the EIS to be written in 'the clearest 
terms possible, and to use language ... that can be readily understood by 
the public." AECL was instructed to indicate "... important areas of 
knowledge where differing opinions within the physical community 
remain unreconciled..."41 However, many respondents regarded the 
document as inaccessible. Virtually every respondent mentioned the lack 
of an index, poor cross-referencing between the EIS and its primary 
supporting documents, and poor cross-referencing between the Guidelines 
and the EIS. NGO criticisms ranged from "...the organization of the EIS 
is unnecessarily confusing,"42 to "... the EIS seems at times to be 
designed to confuse as to enlighten."43 Sometimes all subtlety was 
dispensed with: "...when you go down in the subsections you start to feel 
lost in a labyrinth of jargon and jargonized jargon ... the cornucopia of 
details is used specifically to lose the reader very soon."44 The impression 
of lack of clarity was not expressed by those submissions that argued the 
EIS was adequate. Technical groups, for instance, despite indicating 
deficiencies, found that "[i]n general, the Group found the documentation 
to be well written and presented ... the EIS ... weights the presentation in a 
manner suitable for a broad readership."45 
More consensus existed regarding the issue of whether AECL had given 
due consideration to other points of view. This critique took the form of 
questioning the basis of AECL's expertise and documentation: whether 
the expertise was sufficiently grounded in relevant experience and fields 
of knowledge, whether it was in fact credible and trustworthy, and 
whether the documentation of the EIS was independently peer reviewed. 
On this topic, critics and supporters alike found the AECL case deficient; 
though they disagreed about whether this deficiency rendered the EIS 
inadequate (see above). The EIS documentation thus provides a window 
into the backstage of AECL activities. An analysis of this documentation 
reveals that just over 16% of the references require directly contacting the 
production source. Moreover, the EIS cites just 8 out of 427 (2% overall) 
AECL-affiliated supporting-documents as having appeared in reco-
gnizable and independently peer-reviewed journals. One finds a similar 
41. Panel Guidelines, 2, 7,44. 
42. Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, Public Comments, Pub. 027,3. 
43. Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County, Public Comments, Pub. 031,3. 
44. Ecosystem Approach Group- P. Boldrini, Public Comments, Pub. 033,6. 
45. Report of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Review Group, Public Comments, Pub. 
TEC. 001,19. 
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pattern in the 'R-Public' primary reference, designed to address social 
issues and one of the most widely accessed and referred to primary 
references:46 just over 14% of the cited sources require directly contacting 
the production source. Of journals cited, there were 23 overall (9%), but 
just 1 AECL-affiliated supporting-document was published in a peer-
reviewed and independent journal. 
Critics of the EIS pointed to similar statistics: "126 references out of 263 
references [in the R-Public]—that is, 46 percent of the total—are from the 
nuclear industry, of which 57 are in-house AECL documents."47 
Supporters and critics alike commented upon the lack of independent peer 
review. Tables 3 and 4 present selected examples. 
Table 3. Supporters Attack tlie EIS for Lack of Independent Peer-Review. 
The Supporters 
"We conclude that the AECL documentation of the research that has been done is 
excellent... but much is in the grey literature of AECL reports."48 
The "presentation of the Impact Statement is glib, in some respects. There is a tone of 
'we are right, believe us... [I]t was not clear to what extent the research and studies of 
the proponents have been vetted by independent expertise ... [hence it is] still matters 
of interpretation by them."49 
Table 4. Critics Attack the EIS for Lack of Independent Peer-Review. 
The Critics 
"To an overwhelming degree, the references given consist of internal AECL documents 
... They are subject to internal biases, however innocent and/or sub-conscious they 
maybe." 5 0 
"How many of these documents have been submitted to proper peer review - that is, to a 
scientific assessment conducted by persons who do not derive income from AECL 
related activities?"51 
"AECL is very careful in not presenting the opponents case." 5 2 
"AECL relies on and uses as references their own in-house documents ... [which serve] 
... more as scientific posture than as sources of a substantive basis for the proposal."53 
46. M.A. Greber, E.R. French and J.A.R. Hillier, The Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel 
Waste: Public Involvement and Social Aspects, R-Public. AECL-10712, COG-93-2 
(Pinawa: Whiteshell Laboratories, 1994). 
47. Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, Public Comments, Pub. 049,17. 
48. Canadian Geoscience Council, Public Comments, Pub. TEC. 002, 28-29. 
49. Royal Society of Canada, Public Comments, Pub. TEC. 003. 
50. Phyllis Robbins, Public Comments, Pub. 010, 2. 
51. Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, Public Comments, Pub. 027,36. 
52. Ecosystem Approach Group- P. Boldrini, Public Comments, Pub. 033, 2. 
53. Northwatch, Public Comments, Pub. 046,3-4. 
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What such a shared critique illuminates is that critics and supporters 
alike were implicitly claiming there was too much backstage activity. 
As a front stage public performance the narrative of the EIS appeared to 
bring the backstage activity to light, but in fact the rhetoric of expert 
judgment served to conceal from view the backstage activity. Yet it was 
that backstage activity that informed AECL's experience-based 
judgments, and it was such judgments that constituted the front stage 
personae. When critics and supporters alike referred to the degree of 
backstage activity, or the degree of in-house documentation that had not 
been clearly peer-reviewed by independent sources, they were attacking 
the boundary that the rhetoric of expert judgment attempted to erect. Who 
did the studies? How were they done? Were they credible studies? Are 
they appropriate pieces of information on which to rest policy decisions? 
Why were so many not brought before the trials of the peer-review 
system? These are all questions about the conditions of production. 
Simply critiquing the amount of backstage activity does not directly 
answer these questions, but it does signal a call to open up the backstage 
to critical scrutiny. Questioning the narrative of the EIS and its rhetoric of 
expert judgment thus takes the skeptic back to the conditions of 
production. For supporters of the EIS, endorsing the EIS backstages the 
conditions of production. Even if minor or major revisions are called for 
the implicit answer is that the conditions of production are sufficiently 
credible to warrant the EIS being labeled adequate. For the critic, being 
shielded from the backstage conditions of production is grounds for 
distrust and rejection. For the supporter that same shielding is unfortunate, 
glib, bad public relations, and possibly even understandable in AECL's 
situation (as a regulated, or tasked group, lacking unlimited freedom)— 
but not grounds for labeling the EIS inadequate or incomplete. 
The concealed backstage thus became an issue in itself. The more AECL 
attempted to control information flow, the louder critics called for a 
transparent process. Respondents took the absence of any display of 
conflicting judgments as showing that AECL was concealing uncertainties 
and differences. Left to reconstruct possible backstage activity, criticisms 
of the EIS focused on the credibility of the expert judgments themselves. 
Table 5 depicts three 'species' of specific criticisms of the EIS (with 
representative examples). 
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Table 5. Species of Criticism. 
Misrepresentation Concealment Unreliability 
1. An NGO-critic discussed 
R-Public claims to the effect 
that survey data supported 
the AECL belief that resi-
dents close by a proposed 
repository would be accep-
ting of the repository. The 
counter-claim was that, upon 
inspection of the cited 
documents, the survey data 
showed just the opposite 
relation.54 
2. A submission representing 
several large First Nations 
(FN) groups claimed the EIS 
literature review regarding 
FN issues was doubly 
deficient: while appearing to 
address FN issues, it in fact 
treated FN's as obstacles 
and, because of a lack of 
direct consultation, passed 
over the oral culture of 
FN's.55 
1. A Public Interest 
Group critic points to an 
ambiguity in AECL's 
definition of 'nuclear fuel 
waste' (NFW) to suggest 
political options for 
reprocessing (Rp) spent 
fuel are being smuggled 
into the disposal concept. 
An earlier AECL author 
is cited to the effect that 
NFW is fission products 
from fuel burns, plus 
small amounts of Pu and 
U. The EIS definition 
refers to the fact that Rp 
is not done or planned in 
Canada, but if it were 
then NFW would be 
solidified. The EIS then 
defines NFW as either 
used fuel or solidified 
waste (that is, both). 
The critic thus claims 
the definition of NFW 
leaves room for Rp, and 
thus conceals political 
intent. 56 
1. The SRG argued the 
postclosure reference 
study by AECL was 
unreliable: it was site 
specific and thus too 
narrow to support claims 
about a generic concept; 
the geo sphere models 
were based on a poten-
tially unrepresentative 
area; the BIOTRAC 
models for the biosphere 
study were unrealistic; 
the GEONET model for 
vault analysis did not 
factor in likely changes; 
relevant experts are not 
identified.57 
2. Most NGO critics 
advanced similar claims, 
but also made more gene-
ral unreliability claims: 
AECL and Ontario 
Hydro could not be trus-
ted, they were biased; 
financial incentives ren-
dered their expertise 
suspicious.  
The species of criticism identified as 'unreliability' is a prime example 
of common ground between critic and supporter of the EIS. For instance, 
consider two specific criticisms of the EIS. One, criticism of the risk 
analysis and risk characterization found in the EIS. According to the SRG, 
54. Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, Public Comments, Pub. 049, 16. 
55. Andrew J. Orkin, on behalf of Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN), The 
Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, The Assembly of First Nations of Quebec and Labrador, 
and The Grand Council of the Crées (of Quebec), Public Comments, Pub. 044, passim. 
56. Ecosystem Approach Group - P. Boldrini, Public Comments, Pub. 033, 9. 
57. SRG Report. 
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the EIS risk characterization "does not demonstrate compliance" to AECB 
guidelines.58 The anti-nuclear group Energy Probe made precisely the 
same criticism.59 More significantly, the specific criticism is the same: 
both the SRG and Energy Probe criticize the SYVAC3-CC3 computer-
modeling program used in the risk analysis. Specific shared criticisms 
were: the model only generates results concerning individual doses and 
not risk on the basis of total population; the model data is limited because 
it is drawn from site specific results (Manitoba); parameter values in the 
model are arbitrary and inflexible; too much emphasis in the postclosure 
reference study is placed upon such computer modeling.60 
A second criticism concerned the modeling work done to understand the 
geosphere and biosphere. The SRG is explicit in its distaste for the 
GEONET and BIOTRAC models used by AECL in the postclosure 
assessment study. In the formal context of its October 1995 Report, the 
SRG argues that these computer models are flawed because they are site 
specific, because they assume invariant flow paths (of microorganisms 
and radioactive contaminants), and because BIOTRAC in particular 
ignores microbial activity. Moreover, these models under-estimate 
significant scenarios and do not explore possible human activity and 
climate change.61 In the more informal verbal presentations to the 
Seaborn Panel, prior to the commencement of public hearings, SRG 
members were more forthright. Here we find the BIOTRAC model 
labeled a "house that jack built" kind of model, while the use of the 
inadequate SYVAC model was suggested to be a function of a 
"managerial decision" to develop SYVAC as a source of revenue for 
AECL.62 In similar fashion NGO critics argued that the AECL models 
failed to use "plausible data,"63 and that "so many camels are being 
swallowed in one mouthful that the credibility of the entire exercise is 
called into question."64 The BIOTRAC model, argued another NGO 
critic, is deficient for precisely the same reasons offered by the SRG: it 
ignores microbial activity and human interaction with the biosphere, 
contains arbitrary assumptions, and is site specific.65 
With so much of the backstage absent from view, critics and supporters 
alike outlined general unreliability claims as well. Prominent anti-nuclear 
groups consistently signaled AECL out as especially untrustworthy and 
lacking in credibility. As one succinctly stated: 
58. SRG Report, 14. 
59. Energy Probe, Public Comments, Pub. 014,4. 
60. SRG Report, 80-81 ; Energy Probe, Public Comments, Pub. 014,3 -7. 
61. SRG Report, 60-69. 
62. SRG Transcript, 34 and 112-113. 
63. Energy Probe, Public Comments, Pub. 014, 8. 
64. Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, Public Comments, Pub. 049,40. 
65. Ecosystem Approach Group- P. Boldrini, Public Comments, Pub. 033,passim. 
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One needs only look at the trail of bribery, secret deals, circumvention of 
safeguards, human rights abuses, and other questionable AECL behaviour in its 
export business to question whether its hands are the ones in which we want to be 
placing the safety of Canada's present and future generations.66 
Yet the SRG also found its lack of insight into the backstage of EIS 
production troubling: 
Expert judgment obviously played a major role in AECL's scenario analysis, yet 
the experts used to develop the initial list of factors and the screening arguments 
were not identified, nor were their qualifications given. Moreover, SRG notes that 
non-expert stakeholders are not mentioned as part of the group that initially 
developed and then screened factors.67 
Here the SRG alluded to the same criticism as groups such as Energy 
Probe and the Canadian Council for Nuclear Responsibility. Not only was 
it perceived that the EIS ignored the Panel guidelines to both involve and 
address a broad set of interested parties, but one consequence of this 
omission was that 'publicly dreaded events' were not seriously discussed. 
From the SRG perspective, deliberately excluding consideration of the 
worst possible case was to commit a methodological error: "they have not 
worked the problem backwards."68 NGO critics went further, suggesting 
the omission implied "AECL seems overly fearful of analyzing scenarios 
in which something really bad goes wrong."69 Despite common ground in 
their critique of the EIS handling of significant scenarios, supporter and 
critic end up in different places. This last example of criticism can serve 
as an analogy for the broader picture. The SRG endorses the EIS even 
though it has major criticisms. Even if the SRG uses the contingent 
repertoire here and there to bring into doubt the objectivity of AECL 
choices (such as regards the use of SYVAC), by and large the SRG 
critique extends to methodological and professional grounds only. Other 
technical criticisms stop at a similar point. NGO and other public critics of 
the EIS, those who have reservations and who find the EIS inadequate, 
push beyond questioning methodology and professional credentials. Such 
critics extend the critique to moral, ethical, social and political objections. 
In whichever case we encounter, the act of questioning pushes the inquirer 
back toward the conditions of production. 
66. Submission of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women - Environment 
Committee, Public Comments, Pub. 026,18. 
67. SRG Report, 13. 
68. SRG Transcript, 155. 
69. Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, Public Comments, Pub. 049,41. 
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Backstage: Before the EIS 
Inquiring about the conditions of production means we have to go 
backstage. Clearly what goes on backstage greatly influences the front 
stage performance and, as Hilgartner's notion of 'drama' emphasizes, a 
dialectic of concealment and revelation characterizes such performative 
acts. Thus what does the front stage performance of the EIS simultaneou-
sly reveal and conceal? Let me broach this question by steadily unpeeling 
the backstage. 
Some general assumptions the analysts can make about the backstage 
activity of AECL include the fact that differences of opinion, and nego-
tiations about interpreting results, would have been standard. Degrees of 
differences in interpretation are routine aspects of science across all 
contexts: from esoteric debates,70 to highly controversial and politicized 
areas,71 and whether or not informal72 or more formal contexts are 
involved.73 Nevertheless the EIS adopts (reveals) a unified voice and 
avoids presenting (conceals) dissenting opinions (contrary to Panel 
guidelines). In effect this kind of backstage detail is carefully eliminated 
from the front stage performance. The SRG also utilized a univocal voice 
in the formal context of its Report and subsequent Addendum. Yet that 
unity dissolved in its informal testimony before the Seaborn Panel (1st 
Nov. 1995), and in doing so SRG members offered an explanation for 
AECL's univocal performance. 
When an SRG member indicated the SRG envisioned a century-long 
time scale for a disposal operation, a Panel member responded that 'the 
public' was concerned, not about technology (which could change), but 
the time-scale.74 Seaborn later pursued this theme, asking which criticisms 
the SRG thought AECL could respond to within a relatively brief period 
of time.75 An SRG member responded to the broader question of 
consensus opinion by stating that: 
I agree that we do not have a well developed consensus within the SRG regarding 
the questions that you have posed. And so when we speak we are speaking as 
individuals and not as a team as we were when we presented our report ... The 
70. Collins, Changing Order, 79-112. 
71. Pam Scott, Evelleen Richards and Brian Martin, "Captives of Controversy: The Myth 
of the Neutral Social Researcher in Contemporary Scientific Controversies," Science, 
Technology, and Human Values 15, 4 (1990): 474-94. 
72. Caroline J.S. Picart, "Scientific Controversy as Farce: the Benveniste-Maddox 
counter-trials," Social Studies of Science 24,1 (1994): 7-37. 
73. John Law and R.J. Williams, "Putting Facts Together: A Study of Scientific 
Persuasion," Social Studies of Science 12, 4 (1982): 535-58. 
74. SRG Transcript, 100-101. 
75. SRG Transcript, 105. 
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generic system seems feasible, but the postclosure performance assessment is not 
reliable.76 
Other SRG members made clear how that unreliability might be linked 
to AECL's univocal voice. An SRG member referred to his own 
experience when suggesting "expert opinion is sometimes coloured by 
who you work for and where you come from." The SRG member later 
concluded that AECL needed to "completely rethink their uncertainty 
analysis,"77 the implication being that an AECL affiliation had skewed the 
uncertainty analysis. As Schattschneider once commented, "organization 
is the mobilization of bias."78 
Evidently even other technical elites thought internal organizational 
imperatives structured the univocal voice of the EIS. Yet what was the 
social environment within which AECL operated? In 1987 anti-nuclear 
groups had claimed the policy environment in nuclear matters was akin to 
a subgovernment: a tight alliance of interest groups, administrative 
agencies, and government executive engaged in monopoly decision-
making.79 Mehta has also noted the dominance of nuclear policy-making 
in Canada by an insular policy community of manufacturers, suppliers and 
utilities (such as AECL and Ontario Hydro), their associated lobby groups 
(such as the Canadian Nuclear Association), regulators (AECB), and 
sympathetic government ministries. Mehta argued this insularity had 
resulted in both a lack of accountability to broader citizen goals and 
environmental integrity, and active hostility to citizen participation, on 
behalf of the nuclear policy community.80 Murphy and Kuhn have 
extended this analysis by showing how AECL actively sought to maintain 
this insularity as the terms of reference for the public inquiry were being 
negotiated. AECL was largely successful, as the mandate of the inquiry 
(released in 1989) focused on a disposal concept alone and excluded 
discussion of policy-implications, such as the future of nuclear energy. 
76. SRG Transcript, 106-07. 
77. SRG Transcript, 132-35. 
78. E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realists View of Democracy in 
America (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), 71. 
79. Ted Schrecker, "The Atomic Energy Control Board: Assessing Its Role In Reactor 
Safety Regulation, Submission to the Ontario Nuclear Safety Review, Prepared for Energy 
Probe, 1st September 1987" in The Safety of Ontario's Nuclear Power Reactors, A Scien-
tific and Technical Review, F.K. Hare, 2 Volumes (Ontario: Ministry of Energy, 1988), 
Vol. 1:1-32. On page 11. 
80. Michael D. Mehta, "Regulating Nuclear Power: The Mismanagement of Public 
Consultation in Canada" in In the Chamber of Risks: Understanding Risk Controversies, 
ed. William Leiss (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 102-
124; "Energy Mixes and Future Scenarios: The Nuclear Option Deconstructed" in The 
Integrity Gap: Canada's Environmental Policy and Institutions, eds. E. Lee and A. Perl 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 105-132. 
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Murphy and Kuhn demonstrated this restrictive mandate evolved as 
competing parties sought to shape the agenda.81 AECL favoured a narrow 
technical review since the late 1970's. Yet by 1986 internal 
federal/provincial government negotiations had leaned toward a broader 
review, as well as an agreement to utilize a federal publicly inclusive 
assessment process. AECL won some battles: the technologies and 
methodologies needed to implement a concept were emphasized over and 
above socio-economic and environmental considerations, the word 
'alternatives' was replaced by 'other approaches' (to limit discussion 
primarily to the AECL concept), and discussion of Canada's future energy 
policy was prohibited. Yet AECL lost other battles. The public inquiry 
would not be restricted to a technical review, as shown by a compromise 
to have the SRG but have the SRG subordinate to the Panel. AECL had 
preferred a parallel SRG-Panel set up, which would have allowed 
technical specifications to be discussed in relative isolation of broader 
public deliberation. Prior to the terms of reference being released, NGOs 
had indicated the residual insularity embodied by the narrow mandate (no 
discussion of future energy policy) was politically unacceptable. 
Indeed Kuhn found that at scoping sessions in 1990, held to allow public 
input into the definition of the scope of the inquiry and discuss the details 
of parameters of assessment, that 88% opposed the review process as 
limited in scope. Kuhn concluded that having one stakeholder (AECL) 
define the problem "is to attempt to evade ideological conflicts over the 
goals of energy and nuclear politics."82 Thus in explaining the front stage 
performance of the AECL EIS, the relevant backstage activity is AECL's 
organizational experience of operating within an insular policy 
environment and the resulting commitment to and preference for a 
narrowly conceived technical evaluation of the disposal concept. In effect 
the EIS was an apparatchik, a formidable technical agent of Canada's 
politically insular nuclear policy community. If the political responsibility 
of the EIS was to win consent for the disposal concept, then clearly this 
effort failed. Elsewhere I show that, at the public hearings in 1996-97, lay 
citizens and NGOs routinely rejected the disposal concept because it was 
seen to be a political agent of nuclear expansion.83 A further piece of the 
81. Brenda L. Murphy and Richard G. Kuhn, "Setting the Terms of Reference in 
Environmental Assessments: Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste Management," Canadian 
Public Policy-Analyse de Politiques 27,3 (2001): 249-266. 
82. Richard G. Kuhn, "Public Participation in the Hearings on the Canadian Nuclear Fuel 
Waste Disposal Concept" in Canadian Assessment in Transition, ed. A.J. Sinclair* 
Canadian Association Public Issues Committee, Series No. 5 (Waterloo: Department of 
Geography, University of Waterloo, 1997), 40. 
83. Darrin Durant, "Public Consultation as Performative Contradiction: Limiting 
Discussion in Canada's Nuclear Waste Management Debate" in Nuclear Waste 
Management in Canada: Critical Issues, Critical Perspectives, eds. Darrin Durant and 
Genevieve Fuji Johnson (Vancouver: UBC Press, forthcoming). 
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backstage thus becomes relevant, for it was clear during the public 
hearings that many lay citizens and NGOs did not think the EIS addressed 
their concerns. 
Yet this does not mean that AECL did not seek to address the public per 
se. Indeed the front stage performance of the EIS must be seen in light of 
backstage acknowledgements that consultation with the public was a 
political reality. The backstage is thus not exhausted by technical 
negotiations, differences of interpretation, or a history of insular policy 
making. The contentious process of setting the terms of reference for the 
public inquiry had presented AECL with a number of tensions to resolve. 
Despite the history of nuclear fuel waste management in Canada 
developing largely in isolation of public consultation and deliberation, 
what I have referred to as a process of 'unfolding',84 these tensions meant 
AECL had to creatively adapt. The tensions involved a public audience 
demanding broad public participation and wide-ranging discussion, and a 
regulatory audience both technocratic (AECB) and desiring of discussing 
alternatives and social issues (Environment Canada, the Government of 
Ontario). With its own interest in restricting the scope of discussion, 
AECL had to balance these tensions in order to stage a successful EIS 
performance. 
Backstage: Following Guidelines 
The answer to these tensions was a decision to follow the guidelines, not 
of the Panel, but of the AECB. As several NGO critics pointed out, AECL 
appeared to treat Panel guidelines as obstacles to be overcome rather than 
points of serious dialogue. First Nations groups (with the exception of the 
Meadow Lake Tribal Council) consistently claimed AECL had ignored 
their concerns entirely. Prominent NGOs claimed social and ethical 
aspects were treated as irrationalities to be overcome, that AECL 
displayed an indifference to public involvement, and that the Panel 
guidelines were willfully disregarded. All respondents argued that 
discussion of alternatives to geological disposal was cursory and that 
documentation concerning dissenting opinions was completely absent. 
Yet the EIS does follow the guidelines of the AECB regulatory policy 
document on deep geological disposal of nuclear fuel waste, known as R-
71 and released in January 1985.85 
Several NGO critics pointed to this relationship, though in various 
degrees of specificity. Energy Probe described the EIS as conforming to 
the "self-regulatory" approach of the AECB.86 The Campaign for Nuclear 
84. Darrin Durant and Anna Stanley, "A History of Nuclear Fuel Waste Management in 
Canada" in Nuclear Waste Management in Canada. 
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Phaseout argued that the "current AECL 'EIS' is an engineering feasibi-
lity study [with] origins as an engineering document [R-71]."87 
Northwatch bluntly argued the "indifference to public aspects of the 
review" and "scientific posturing" of the EIS was directly related to its 
origins as a technical document (the R-71).88 What is R-71? Released in 
January 1985, R-71 addressed the scope and schedule of a concept 
assessment phase for disposing of high-level nuclear waste, and outlined 
what form a concept assessment document (CAD) should take. In R-71, 
geological disposal is indicated to be the preferred option, and a thorough 
public scrutiny is envisioned. The overview notes the core issues: 
engineered and natural barriers to isolate wastes, a generic concept 
assessment with no mention of a specific site, and long-term evaluation 
based upon predictive modeling with only a broad range of potential site 
variables provided. Acceptability was defined in the following way: 
If Concept Assessment does demonstrate the likelihood that deep disposal in a 
pluton can satisfy the technical requirements for health, safety, security and 
environmental protection, the AECB will consider this concept to be acceptable. 
The concept of disposal in plutonic rock will be judged on its own merits without 
reference to other options.89 
AECL's battle from 1986 to 1990, to keep "alternatives" out of the 
concept assessment phase, can be seen in the context of the AECB's 
policy directive that deep geological disposal would be judged in isolation 
of considering other options. 
Note the AECB criterion concentrates on technical requirements, 
implying both the secondary nature of social requirements and their 
unambiguous separation. Critic's contention that social aspects were 
neglected can thus be traced back to this policy context. Note the assumed 
dualism in the way R-71 addresses social aspects: 
Since the disposal of nuclear fuel waste raises social and economic questions as 
well as those of a technical nature, the AECB will endeavour to ensure that, 
concurrently with the technical review, the social and economic issues are also 
given due consideration.90 
If critics are correct that the AECL EIS derived its form and character 
from the AECB R-71, one means to test this contention is to explore what 
'due consideration' (of social and economic aspects) meant in the context 
of R-71. 
The AECB R-71 outlines two kinds of requirements for a CAD: those 
that apply to the disposal concept itself (section 2.2), and those that apply 
87. Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, Public Comments, Pub. 027, 11. 
88. Northwatch, Public Comments, Pub. 046,3. 
89. AECBR-71, 6. 
90. Ibid 
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to the assessment and documentation of the concept (section 2.3). In 
section 2.2, the AECB outlines pre-closure and post-closure periods, 
indicates its preference for predictive modeling assessments of the post-
closure study, and emphasizes that a design for the repository should 
avoid dependence on human intervention or maintenance. In section 2.3, 
the AECB requested: a separation of the subject into its constituent parts, 
an acknowledgement of limitations in data, clear arguments linking 
models to reality, an establishment of technical feasibility, the provision 
of dose calculations for members of the public, an analysis of human 
intrusion scenarios and environmental impacts, a quality assurance 
program, and an evaluation of both existing and future technology. The 
penultimate requirement listed "generic issues pertaining to socio-
economic impacts,"91 such as public perception of risk, availability of 
resources to do the job, transportation, the skill base available, job 
creation, community services and the effect on property values. The final 
section was the most specific, listing twelve points concerning predictive 
modeling that ought to be addressed.92 
The R-71 emphasizes social and economic impacts, as opposed to the 
Panel guidelines call to explore social and economic issues in a broad 
fashion. The R-71 assumes a technical presentation is appropriate, 
whereas the Panel guidelines demand the technical presentation be 
couched in a fashion accessible to a broad audience. The EIS also 
conforms to the R-71 outline of a CAD. The EIS is divided into pre and 
post-closure studies, it relies heavily upon predictive modeling, and it 
emphasizes technical feasibility as the criterion of success. Recall that 
Murphy and Kuhn93 argued AECL opposed the movement, in negotia-
tions concerning the terms of reference, away from a very narrow 
technical review to one that included a broader discussion. We can see 
this opposition as structured by 'organizational bias' to remain close to the 
AECB guidelines, as outlined in R-71. 
The backstage activity that went into the production of the AECL EIS 
thus included a residual commitment to the notion of a narrow technical 
review. What we have thus seen is that the more one questions the 
performance of AECL in the EIS, the more one is taken back to the 
conditions of production. From a front stage performance characterized by 
a unifying narrative of dialogue and consultation, and the rhetoric of 
expert judgment, following the EIS back stage takes one to a host of 
possible position-statements regarding the adequacy of the EIS. Further 
exploration of the EIS backstage revealed a number of criticisms, from 
questioning the clarity of the document to a shared critique (critic and 
9\. AECB R-71, U. 
92. AECB R-71, 14-15. 
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supporter) of AECL's expertise and judgment. A good deal of backstage 
activity was thus revealed, as critiques of the lack of independent review 
of EI S documentation pointed to a shared claim that too much activity 
was being backstaged. The extent of concealment undermined the front 
stage rhetoric of expert judgment, as critic and supporter alike began to 
ask questions about the conditions of production and the degree to which 
AECL was neglecting uncertainties and differences of opinion. Misrepre-
sentation, concealment, and unreliability claims were thus made against 
the AECL EIS. Groups such as the SRG suggested implausible modeling 
work was related to a mobilized bias. NGO-critics suggested backstage 
political decisions shaped the EIS front stage performance. The conditions 
of production—the ultimate backstage—were thus highlighted, as a 
history of contentious political negotiations came into view. A policy 
origin-point (the AECB R-71) strongly suggests a technocratic focus 
structured the front stage performance of the EIS. 
By 1995 the SRG and NGOs were already arguing that accepting the 
AECL disposal concept was akin to 'swallowing camels in the house that 
jack built'. Nevertheless the federal government response to the Seaborn 
Panel report of 1998 was to formulate one response for the public and a 
different one for 'the technical' side. The guiding assumption in this 
dualist strategy is that resistance to deep geological disposal took two 
forms: credentialed experts and their technical objections, and public 
opposition groups and their social objections. 
Despite such an unsound assumption, the NWMO largely takes for 
granted the ability of 'the experts' to independently solve any technical 
deficiencies. The NWMO recommendation to Government of November 
2005 implicitly divided appropriate technical methods of disposal from 
social acceptance of an implementation plan.94 Elsewhere I have shown 
how the NWMO has concentrated its efforts on how to make technical 
proposals socially acceptable.95 This technical-social dualism implicitly 
proscribes normative models. Credentialed specialist and their home 
agencies are thus presented as advancing 'technical deficiencies', not 
'social concerns'. The lay public is presented as advancing 'social 
concerns' that probably cloud their ability to make independent and 
informed 'technical evaluations'. This technical-social dualism implicitly 
minimizes the expectation that shared lines of resistance might prevail. 
Research in both the social study of technical controversies, and the 
public understanding of science, have done much to reveal the inadequacy 
of any view that postulates context-independent strategies for establishing 
94. Nuclear Waste Management Organization, Choosing a Way Forward: The Future 
Management of Canada's Nuclear Fuel, Final Study (Toronto: NWMO, November 
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and/or disputing credibility. However this body of work can also be taken 
as showing that particular dualisms, boundaries, strategies and rhetoric 
vary in how they are deployed, according to context, while simultaneously 
remaining as symbolic resources that form part of standard narratives for 
making credibility-claims. 
For instance in a study of opposition to a waste disposal isolation plant 
in New Mexico, Downey showed how strategies for undermining or 
establishing credibility varied according to the cultural identities of 
speakers, audiences, and the content of their communication.96 In a study 
of expert disputes in Canada's MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, 
Campbell showed how uncertainty and the level of knowledge could be 
used strategically in arguments. Campbell found (expert) uncertainty 
could vary according to the social circumstances of organizations.97 In 
both cases it remained situationally dependent whether 'identity' or 
'uncertainty' formed part of oppositional claims, and whether they formed 
part of successful claims or not. Yearley found a similar result for 
'impartiality', in a dispute involving conservationists and government 
agencies over a proposed Marina in the Northern Irish town of Killyleagh. 
Yearley showed how failures to establish neutrality varied according to 
the situational success of separating facts and values, and with specific 
features of the adversarial context itself.98 
In all of these cases symbolic resources remained available to be discur-
sively drawn upon according to the goals of the particular disputing party. 
In Yearley's case, competing sides vied for the label of 'impartial'. In 
Campbell's case, disputing experts made different things out of the 
presence of uncertainty. Actors put these cultural resources to use for their 
own purposes. Mercer has found this kind of social action in an Australian 
public inquiry into whether electric and magnetic fields, associated largely 
with powerlines, are harmful to health.99 Mercer showed that method 
discourses, while not drawn upon in a mechanical fashion—as they could 
vary in how they were used according to the specific conclusions of 
studies—remained valuable resources for channeling interpretations of 
data toward previously preferred policy/technical conclusions. It is 
this flexibility of cultural resources—identity, uncertainty, impartiality, 
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method discourses, and so on—that is systematically deleted from view 
when the technical-social dualism is deployed. 
The result of this kind of dualism is a default encoding of dissent as 
either scientific criticism or social evaluation. The either/or relation is 
analogous to the categorical distinction between risk and ethics. Drawing 
upon the case of genetically modified organisms, Wynne argued the 
distinction between risk and ethics patronized the public as intellectually 
vacuous. It also serves to obscure public judgments about the quality of 
expert institutions, and is thus implicated in a deep-seated cultural move 
in which expert institutions systematically misread public complaints 
about exaggerated claims as a misunderstanding of the nature of risk.100 In 
a similar fashion, Wynne also argued that contemporary institutionalized 
policy discourse constructs the public as only concerned with risk and 
consequences rather than a plurality of meanings tied up with the purposes 
of knowledge.101 I suggest the technical-social dualism performs similar 
functions of institutional legitimacy and deletion. 
The technical-social dualism obscures the fact that both experts and the 
lay public make discursive use of similar sets of resources when disputing 
technical claims. Constructing the public as only venturing 'social 
criticism' can be a means to present public critique as lacking legitimacy 
to the extent social criticisms remain the oppositional strategy of the lay 
public. This preserves a domain in which only credentialed experts offer 
'reasoned considerations'. The technical-social dualism thus performs 
work for institutions involved in policy-making, serving to maintain a 
hierarchy in which 'technical claims' can be immunized against 'social 
concerns'. A focus on shared lines of dissent is one way of disrupting this 
hierarchy. The technical-social dualism must be viewed as an ex post 
facto strategy for procuring preferred socio-technical policy options, 
rather than an accurate portrayal of the nature of dissent. In this case, 
shared pathways of dissent included suspicion about the rhetoric of expert 
judgment, criticism of a lack of independent peer review, a judgment of 
unreliability, dissatisfaction regarding narrowly conceived and internally-
negotiated terms of reference, and a judgment that AECL displayed poor 
'body language.' A technical-social dualism results in this shared 
resistance being rendered as public misunderstanding, and thus not a part 
of considerations about technical claims. Challenging the dualism, by 
showing the shared lines of dissent, is one useful stratagem for displaying 
the full spectrum of cultural evaluations of sociotechnical policy-making. 
100. Brian Wynne, "Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risk and Ethics on 
GMOs," Science as Culture 10,4 (2001): 445-481. 
101. Brian Wynne, "Risk and Environment as Legitimately Discourses of Technology: 
Reflexivity Inside Out?" Current Sociology 50, 3 (2002): 459-77. For a critical analysis of 
Wynne, see Darrin Durant, "Accounting for Expertise: Wynne and the autonomy of the lay 
public actor," Public Understanding of Science (forthcoming). 
